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ILLEGAL DETENTION AND THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF CONFESSIONS
ZEALOUS police activity in the investigation and punishment of crime creates
a continued possibility of invasion of individual civil liberties. This conflict is
acutely manifested wvhen the difficult task of detecting and convicting offenders
induces police agents and prosecutors to violate or circumvent stautory and
judicial rules requiring prompt arraignment of arrested persons. Since early
examination of suspects is of great assistance in procuring evidence and elicit-
ing confessions,1 public officials often urge'that arraignment legislation should
be made more flexible or that "technical" violations of the existing statutes should
not preclude admission into evidence, in subsequent trials, of illegally obtained
testimony.2 Functionally, two interrelated problems are involved ., (1) The
enunciation of workable regulations governing the arraignment and examina-
tion of suspects; and (2) the formulation of rules regarding the admissibility
into evidence of confessions obtained directly or indirectly, in violation of the
arraignment and examination statutes.
Certain of the various presently applicable federal statutes impose upon law-
enforcing officials the duty of bringing arrested persons before committing 4
magistrates or commissioners, "immediately," 5 "forthwith," 6 or "without
delay." 7 The courts have read an analogous requirement of immediate com-
mitment into the provision of the Judicial Code, regulating arrests by United
States marshals and other officials, not subject to specific statutes.8 Similar legis-
lation exists in all states.9 Examination of persons held in custody is curbed by
1. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, on H. R. 3690 (78th Congress 1st Session, 1943) passim (cited hereinafter
as Hearings). See HOPKINS, OuR LAw -Ess POLICE (1931) 18 et seq.
2. Testimony of Francis Biddle, Attorney General of the United States, in Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 35; testimony of Major Edward Kelly, Sup't of Police, Dist. of CoL,
id. at 1-10; Statement of Int. Assoc., Chiefs of Police, id. at 43-4.
3. See PRELIMINARY DRAn OF FED. RuLEs CaIm. PRoc. (1943) 11-16.
4. "Commitment," or "committal," is the judicial process by which a person is sent to
prison. The terms are used in two senses: (1) after a preliminary hearing, a suspect may
be committed to await trial before a judge and jury or admitted to bail upon a recognizance;
(2) after conviction, a person may be committed to serve the appointed term. MouAwrT,
POLICE LA v (7th ed., 1941) 37. The word "arraignment" is often used interchangeably with
"commitment" in describing the first of these processes. See Waite, Comment (1944) 42
MICH. L. REv. 909. The terms arraignment, commitment, and presentment are used inter-
changeably in this Comment.
5. 49 STAT. 77 (1935), 5 U. S. C. § 300(a) (1940). This section regulates arrests by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
6. 20 STAT. 341 (1879), 18 U. S. C. § 593 (1940). This section stipulates the procedure
to be followed in arresting persons for operating illicit distilleries.
7. D. C. Ray. STAT. (1875) § 397, D. C. CODE (1940) § 4-140.
8. 28 STAT. 416 (1894), 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1940).
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the constitutionally protected privilege against self-incrimination 1o and by the
due process clauses," which privilege suspects to refuse to answer questions and
deny officials the right to interrogate for unreasonably protracted periods,12 to
use force 13 or threats 14 in the course of examination, or to forbid consultation
with attorneys and friends. 15
9. ALA. CoDE (1940) tit. 15, § 160; AIZ. CODE AI'N. (1939) §§ 44-107,44-140,44-141;
Anx DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §§ 3729, 3731; CA. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1941) §§ 821-29;
847-49; Cow. STAT. AN. (Michie, 1935) c. 48, § 428; CozeN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 239;
DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §§ 4456, 5173; D. C. CODE (1940) §§ 4-140,23-301; FLA. STAT. Az.
(1943) §§ 901.06, 901.23; GA. CODE ANN. (Park, Skillman, & Strozier, 1936) §§ 27-210,
27-212; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 19-515, 19-518, 19-614,19-615; ILTL.ANN. STAT. (Smith-
Hjurd, 1935) c. 38, §§ 655, 660; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1942 repl. vol.) § 9-704; IOWA CoDZ
(1939) §§ 13478,13481, 13486,13488; KANs. STAT. AN.N. (Corrick, 1935) § 62-610; Ky. RE%.
STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1943) §§26.360, 447.010; Ky'. Cumu. CoDE Ai.N. (Carroll, 1938)
§§ 45, 46; LA. CODE Clam. Paoc. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§ 66, 79, 80; .M. REv. STAT. (1930)
c. 145, § 9; 16D. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1943 Supp.) art, 66%, § 260; MAss. Gsin. LAws (1932)
c. 276, §§ 22, 29, 34; Mic. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1938) §§ 28.863, 28.872, 28.873, 28.8M5;
MiNN. STAT. (1941) §§629.39, 629.46; MISS. CODE AN. (1942) §2473; Mo.
Rv. STAT. ANN. (1939) §§ 3862, 3883; MoNr. REv. CODE (Anderson and McFarland, 1935)
§§ 11731, 11739-40; NiB. Coup. STAT. (1929) § 29412; NE%. Com. LAws (Hillyer, 1929)
§10744-48, 10762-64; N. H. REv. LAws (1942) c. 423, § 13; N. J. STAT. A:NN. (1939)
§ 2:216-9; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) § 42-202, 42-402, 42-1914; N. Y. CrTM. CODE (1939)
§ 158-59, 165, 185; N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §§ 15-24, 15-46;
N. D. Come. LAws ANN. (1913) §§ 10543, 10548. 10576, 10578; OHio Gs"r. CoDE Am.
(Page, 1939) §§ 13432-3, 13432-4; Oic.. STAT. (1941) tit. 22, §9 17677, 181, 205; O=-
Come. LAWS ANN. (1940) §§26-1538, 26-1547; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 19, §§3, 4;
R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. (1938) c. 625, § 68; S. C. CODE (1942) §§ 907,920; S. D. CoDE (1939)
§§ 34.1608, 34,1619-24; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §§ 11515, 11544; Tsx. STAT.
(Vernon, 1926) Code Crim. Proc. art. 233-35; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §§ 105-44,
105-13-23, 105-15-1; VT. PuBuc LAws (1933) §§ 2342, 2519; VT. LAws: (1937) No. 49,
§ 2; VA. CoDE (Michie, Sublett, and Stedman, 1942) §§ 4826, 4827a; WVAsH. RE-. STAT.
(Remington, 1932) § 1949; NV. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett, and Stedman, 1943) §§ 243,
6150; Wis. STAT. (1943) §S 361.08, 364.10, 364.14; Wyo. RE. STAT. ANN. (Courtright,
1931) §§ 33-108,33-110,33-115; WVo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1940) §§ 33-2110,
33-2114.
10. U. S. CoNsT. AMND-. V. It has been held that the 14th Amendment does not require
the states to grant a privilege against self-incrimination. See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372
(1905) ; Banks v. State, 18 Ala. App. 376, 93 So. 293 (1921) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97,
170 AtI. 98 (1934) ; People v. Schade, 292 N. Y. S. 612, 161 Misc. 212 (1936). However,
most state constitutions expressly grant the privilege. See, e.g., Ky. Co:.ST. § 11: .Mn:;..
CoNsT. Art 1, 66; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6; UTAH CoNsT. Art. I, § 12.
11. U. S. CoxsT. AMEND. V; AMEND. XIV, § 1.
12. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944); LIsenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219
(1941); Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). This process has been characterized
as an "inquisition," analogous to the practice of medieval heresy-hunting agencies. Enoch
v. Commonwealth, 141" Va.411, 126 S. E. 222 (1925). See also Pound, Inquisitoral Confes-
sims (1915) 1 CouR. L. Q. 77.
13. Ward v. Texms, 316 U. S. 547 (1942); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
14. White v. Tex-as, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
15. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
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Disclosure at trial of a violation of the arraignment statutes confronts the
courts with the task of deciding whether such illegal conduct should result in
the automatic exclusion of confessions or evidence thereby obtained, with the
consequent reversal of convictions predicated wholly or partly thereon, or wheth-
er exclusion and/or reversal should be dependent upon the utilization of directly
coercive procedures by the police or prosecutors. The rule in effect in the fed-
eral courts until 1943 1 and the-rules still in effect in almost all states "1 made
the "voluntariness" of a confession the basic touchstone of its admissibility into
evidence. Accordingly, self-incriminatory statements were excluded when they
had been made after incommunicado inquisitions, 8 physical violence,19 or prom-
ises of immunity or lighter punishment.20 However, if a confession were found
16. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1 (1924) ; Hardy v. United States, 186
U. S. 224 (1902) ; Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897) ; Wilson v. United States,
162 U. S. 613 (1896).
17. See cases cited infra notes 18, 19, 20. In some jurisdictions the burden of proof of
demonstrating that a proffered confession was made without the inducement of threats,
intimidation, or promises of immunity is on the prosecution. People v. Jones, 150 P. (2d)
801 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944) ; see Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114,189 N. W. 558 (1922) ; 2 WnAR-
ToN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1935) § 601.
18. Osborn v. People, 83 Colo. 4, 262 Pac. 892 (1927) ; People v. Rogers, 303 Il. 578,
136 N. E. 470 (1922) ; State v, Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) ; Ammons v.
State, 80 Miss. 592,32 So. 9 (1902) ; State v. McCullum, 18 Wash. 394, 51 Pac. 1044 (1897).
19. Beckham v. State, 100 Ala. 15, 14 So. 859 (1893) (threat of violence) ; Rowe v.
State, 98 Fla. 98, 123 So. 523 (1929) (beating with rubber hose) ; White v. State, 129 Miss.
182, 91 So. 903 (1922) ("water-icure" administered by vigilantes) ; People v. Cohen, 243
App. Div. 245, 276 N. Y' S. 851, 855 (2d Dep't 1935) (seveie beating) ; State v. Brittain,
117 N. C. 783, 23 S. E. 433 (1895) (husband threatened to abandon wife unless she con-
fessed incest with her father) ; State v. Smythe, 148 Wash. 65, 268 Pac, 133 (1928) (slapping
face) ; State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57 (1847) (whipping) ; Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 108 (1829)
(lashing all night).
The degree to which such practices are utilized by the police is generally unappreciated
by laymen. "In various cases which occurred between 1920 and 1930, the Wickersham Com-
mission found that suspected persons had been starved, kept awake many days and nights,
confined in pitch-dark and airless cells; had been beaten with fists, clubs, blackjacks, rubber
hose, telephone books, straps, whips, beaten on the shins, under the knee cap (at the point
of the patellar reflex), across the abdomen, the throat, the face, the head, the shoulders,
above the kidneys, on the buttocks and legs; had had their arms twisted, their testicles twisted
and squeezed; had been given tear-gas, scopolamin infections and chloroform; had been
made to touch corpses and hold the hands of murdered persons in morgues; that women had
been lifted by the hair; in one case, a man had been laid flat on the floor and lifted repeatedly
by his organs of sex. This in modern America between 1920 and 1930, in the fifteenth decade
of the Constitution, and for the purpose of obtaining 'voluntary' confessions of guilt."
HOPKINS, OuR LAWLESS POLICE (1931) 25. See also Bullock v. United States, 122 F. (2d)
213, 215 (App. D. C., 1941) ; Perrygo v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 181 (App. D. C., 1924) ;
IV REPORT OF NAT'L Comm. ON LAw OBSERVANE & ENFORCEMENT (Wickersham Comm.)
(1931) 170 et seq.; Lowell, Judicial Use of Torture (1897) 11L HARV. L. REV. 220, 290.
20. Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244 (1882) ; People v. Thompson, 84 Cal. 598, 605 (1890);
Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 186 (1873) ; Green v. State, 88 Ga. 516 (1891) ; Rector v.
Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 468 (1882) ; Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6 (1887) ; Commonwealth v.
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to have been "voluntarily" made, illegalities attendant upon its procurement were
relevant only in a subsequent civil action against the misfeasant oficials 2 ' or
as a possible basis for obtaining the sympathy of the jury, the sentencing judge,
or the paroling or pardoning officials. There was also the possibility that ex-
posure of the illegal detention would induce dismissal of the culpable officers by
their superiors 22-a remedy which might deter future transgressions and pro-
tect civil liberties, but which Was useless to the convicted persons.
RECENT SuPRamE CouRr CAsEs
But in its decisions in the Spring of 1943, in the tAvin cases of McNabb v.
United States 2 and Anderson v. Uvitcd States,24 the Supreme Court departed
from the older discretionary standard and held that violation of the arraignment
Nott, 135 Mass. 269 (1883); People v. Wolcott. 51 Mich. 612 (1833); State v. York, 37
N. H. 175 (185) ; People v. Reilly, 224 N. Y. 90, 120 N. E. 113 (1913) ; State v. Drake, 113
N. C. 624 (1S93) ; Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt 576 (Va. 18G7) ; State v. May, 41
Wyo. 365, 285 Pac. 992 (1930).
21. People v. Mummiana, 258 N. Y. 394, 180 N. E. 94 (1932) ; Honeycutt v. State, 67
Tenn. 371 (1875); State v. Sanders, 84 N. C. 728 (1281) ; Commonwealth v. Howe, 132
Mass. 250 (1882); State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695 (1831) ; State v. Revells, 35 La. An. 302
(1883).
22. Testimony of Hon. Sam Hobbs, Representative from Alabama in Hcarings, op.
cit. supra note 1, 18-19. It is probable, however, that this sanction is rarely invoked. Chafee
et al. Memorandum on Detention of Arrested Persons in A STAT=aTI:;T BY Tr Co1vzurri-z
ON THE BilL OF RIGHTS OF THE AEECAx B.&R AssocLNTioN ON H. R. 39690 (1944) 18.
(Hereafter cited as Menwranmdun).
23. 318 U. S. 332 (1943). The McNabb case has not induced state courts to abandon
the "voluntariness" criterion. See State v. Browning, 173 S. W. (2d) 77 (Ark. Sup. Ct.
1944) ; People v. Jones, 150 P. (2d) 801, 804-05 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944). It is unlikely that the
admission of confessions after illegal detentions would be considered such a violation of the
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice" as to require reversal of state court convic-
tions grounded thereon under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Buchalter v. New Yorl; 319
U. S. 427 (1943) ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926) ; Hurtado v. California,
110 U. S. 516 (1884).
However, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 32? U. S. 143 (1944), the court held that a confes-
sion obtained after 36 hours of unremitting questioning Nwas "inherently coercive" and barred
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the majority opinion specifically refused to "resolve
any of the disputed questions of fact," it is clear, as Mr. justice Jackson indicated in his dis-
sent that the court has created an irrefutable presumption of law that a confession obtained
after 36 hours of questioning is involuntary. This marks a significant departure, in the han-
dling of civil liberties issues arising out of the conduct of criminal trials in the state courts,
from such cases as Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) and Lisenba v. California, 314
U. S. 219 (1941), where the Supreme Court overrode the findings of fact as to fairness.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice -Reed-the lone dissenter in the McNabb and
Anderson cases-went along with the majority opinion in the Aslraft case. The dissenters
in the latter case were Justices Jackson, Frankfurter and Roberts, apparently applying again
the philosophy of their dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624 (1943).
24. 318 U. S. 350 (1943).
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statutes tainted confessions secured during illegal detention so as to make their
admission reversible error per se.25
The record on appeal in the McNabb case indicated that the defendants had
been subjected to intensive interrogation for several days after arrest, without
previous arraignment, in seeming violatioh of the federal statutes.2  During this
period of apparently illegal confinement, the suspects-semi-literate and un-
sophisticated Tennessee mountain moonshiners-were subjected to unremitting
questioning; they neither requested, nor were informed that they were entitled
to the assistance of counsel.27 Eventually admissions of guilt were elicited from
the suspects; these confessions were admitted into evidence, over objections at
trial, and constituted the basis of the Government's case. Both in the trial court
and on appeal,28 the defendants' sole argument was that the "pressures" em-
ployed by the federal agents barred the confessions under the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Constitutional question was by-passed in the majority opinion in the
Supreme Court.29 Instead the decision was predicated upon the Court's tradi-
tional implied power to formulate rules of evidence for federal criminal trials.A0
In the Anderson case,31 the Supreme Court held that confessions of persons
-accused of depredating property of the Tennessee Valley Authority during a
miner's strike-were inadmissible in a federal trial, where there had been pro-
longed detention by county officials in violation of state statutes, 32 and pre-
25. "Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard
of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without mak-
ing the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United
States, 318.U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
26. The statutes mentioned were: 48 STAT. 1008 (1934); 5 U. S. C. § 300a (1940);
28 STAT. 416 (1894), 29 STAT. 184 (1896), 31 STAT. 956 (1901), 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1940)
20 STAT. 341 (1879), 18 U. S. C. § 593 (1940).
The McNabb case was actually decided upon a misapprehension of the facts as the Mc-
Nabb brothers had been arraigned by proper and timely procedure. However, the record
failed to show the arraignment. Testimony of Attorney General Biddle, Hearings, op. cit.
.trpra note 1, 3-4. Upon retrial the confessions were admitted in evidence and the defendants
were convicted of manslaughter. This conviction has been upheld on appeal, McNabb v.
United States, 142 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944).
27. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 335 (1943).
28. McNabb v. United States, 123 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
29. "It is true, as the petitioners assert, that a conviction obtained in the federal courts,
the foundation of which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental
by the Constitution, cannot stand . . . In the view we take of the case, however, it becomes
unnecessary to resolve the Constitutional issue pressed upon us." McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332, 339, 340 (1943).
30. Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch. 75, 130-31 (U. S. 1807) ; United States
v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 643-44 (United States 1818) ; Funk v. United States, 290 U. S.
371 (1933). See also THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATIES ON EVIDENcE (1898) 530-31
31. 318 U. S. 350 (1943).
32. "No person can be committed to prison for any criminal matter, until examination
thereof be first had before some magistrate." TENN. CoDE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 11515,
This law has been strictly construed as barring pre-arraignment examination, Polk
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arraignment interrogation by these officials in collaboration with agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Dicta in the McNabb and Azderson cases seemingly elevated deterrence of
illicit conduct by law-enforcing officials to a position co-ordinate with the insu-
lation of suspects from unfair pre-trial treatment as an independent reason for
exclusion of extra-judicial confessions. However, since the records on appeal
in both cases supported the inference that the barred confessions had been invol-
untarily extorted 3 3 and since strict compliance with the terms or constructions
of the arraignment statutes is sometimes impossible,34 divergent interpretations
of the "MIcNabb" doctrine emerged in subsequent decisions in the lower federal
courts. Apparently motivated by the desire to prevent hypertechnical require-
ments from hampering apprehension and punishment of criminals, some courts
invoked familiar precedents to write a "rule of reason" into the nascent "absolute
illegality" doctrine. Thus in United States v. Klee,35 a district court overruled
the argument that a confession was barred whenever it had been obtained after
pre-arraignment questioning. The implication of the decision w,:as that detentions
became illegal, and extra-judicial confessions inadmissible, only when there was
gross delay in bringing suspects before committing officials.20
Conversely, in other inferior federal tribunals, the s,3cial objective of pro-
tecting society from crime was wholly subordinated to the desideratum of cur-
tailing lawless conduct by law-enforcing officials. Especially in two recurrent
situations, the McArabb case was construed as laying down the mechanistic for-
mula that any type of illegal detention of a suspect required preclusion of his con-
fession. The most questionable application came in a series of cases reversing
convictions based on apparently uncoerced confessions, made while arraignment
was delayed because of the unavoidable absence of the Commissioners on week
days or because the arrest had occurred on Sunday or late on Saturday.3T In
v. State, 170 Tenn. 270, 94 S. W. (2d) 394 (1936): State ex rel. Morris v. National Surety
Co., 162 Tenn. 547, 39 S. W. (2d) 581 (1931).
33. Mc 1Tabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332,333-38 (1943) ; Anderson v. United States,
318 U. S. 350, 353-56 (1943). The invalidity of this inference in the Mcabb case is indi-
cated by the conviction of the MlcNabbs, on retrial. See note 26, supra.
34. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
35. 50 F. Supp. 679 (E. D. Wash. 1943).
36. "The Government's position is that by the McNabb decision the Supreme Court
simply added to the criteria by which the voluntary or involuntary nature of a confession
is to be judged an additional yardstick to assist the court in its process of measuring. The
Government argues that any other appraisal of the McNabb decision would make of it an
unworkable barrier to the reasonable administration of criminal justice ... After careful
study of the McNabb opinion, I have concluded that the Government's position is cor-
rect.. ." United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679,683 (E. D. Wash. 1943).
37. Many of these cases arose in the District of Columbia where the city police officials
are subject to federal laws. See supra note 7. In one case, Avhere the accused was arrested
at 5:00 P. Ml. on a Saturday afternoon and arraigned at 11:30 A. Al. Monday, it was held that
his confession, made at 8:00 P. M. on the day of arrest, wras inadmissible for any purpose.
United States v. Afeely, No. 72187, United States District Court, District of Columbia
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all these cases arraignment had taken place at an early hour on the next business
day. In another group of decisions, it was held that a voluntary declaration of
guilt immediately after arrest was rendered inadmissible mnnc pro tune by a
subsequent unnecessary delay in arraignment.36
This retroactive illegality test was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Spring
of 1944 in United States v. Mitchell.9 The defendant had confessed a few min-
utes after arrest and arrival at a District of Columbia police station. Thereafter,
he was illegally retained in custody for eight days before being accorded a prelim-
inary hearing. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals 40 that the admis-
sion of guilt had been improperly received in evidence was reversed with the
Delphic declaration that "the foundations for application of the McNabb doctrine
[were] ... here totally lacking ... there was no disclosure induced by ille-
gal detention, no evidence was obtained in violation of any legal rights, .... , 41
Doubtless Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Mitchell case was intend-
ed, inter alia, to restrain trial juges from acting precipitously in excluding con-
fessions, under the influence of his own hortatory language in the McNabb
case. Yet because it gave birth to a new formula for determining admissibility
-the "inducement by detention" test-the net effect of the litchell decision maq
be to expand the penumbra of uncertainty in which federal peace officers oper-
(1943). See also United States v. Johnston, No. 431303, Municipal Court, District of Co-
lumbia (1943) ; United States v. Wilburn, Nos. 71877, 72342, United States District Court,
District of Columbia (1943).
In one case in the Southern District of New York, the accused was arrested at 7:00
A. M. and arraigned at 1:00 P. M. the same day: despite the fact that the delay in arraign-
ment was said to have been caused solely by the absence of the Commissioner, the court
excluded all evidence of confessions made between arraignment and arrest. United States
v. Fedorka (S. D. N. Y.), July 19, 1943. See also United States v. Corn, 54 F. Supp. 307
(E. D. Wisc. 1944) ; United States v. Hart, N. D. Ill., May 3, 1943.
38. United States v. Haupt, 136 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) (McNabb case criti-
cized, but followed) ; Gros v. United States, 136 F. (2d) 878 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) ; United
States v. Hoffman, 137 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Runnels v. United States, 138 F.
(2d) 346 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
39. 322 U. S. 65 (1944). Mr. Justice Reed, who had dissented in both the McNabb and
Anderson cases, wrote a concurring opinion in the Mfitchell case. Asserting his belief that
the former "voluntariness" criterion should be reinstated, Justice Reed said in his McNabb
dissent: "I question whether this [detention test] offers to the trial courts and the peace
officers a rule of admissibility as clear as the test of the voluntary character of the confes-
sion." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 349 (1943). In the Mitchell case, Justice
Reed said: "The juristic theory under which a confession should be admitted or barred is
bottomed on the testimonial trusworthiness of the confession. If the confession is freely
made without inducement or menace, it is, admissible." United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S.
65,71 (1944).
40. Mitchell v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 426 (App. D. C. 1943). This decision was
predicated on the alleged mandate of the McNabb case.
41. Mitchell v. United States, 322 U. S. 65, 69, 70 (1944).
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ate. At least the McNabb decisions taken literally, had the virtue of definiteness
in barring all confessions made after protracted detention, save possibly where
uncontrollable extrinsic factors were responsible for the delay in arraignment
and prevented it from becoming illegal.42 But there is language in the Mitchell
case which can reasonably be construed as permitting admission of confessions
made during illegal detention, provided that the delay in arraignment were found
not to have "induced" the confession. If this result were intended by the Court,
"inducement by detention" is merely a new verbal symbol for the old "volun-
tariness" test.43 Instead of serving as an independent basis for exclusion, the
"McNabb doctrine" will then have been reduced to the status of a presumption
of law that where illegal detention has been continued for a certain period, con-
fessions obtained thereafter are conclusively deemed to have been "involuntary."
If Congress continues to ignore investigative realities-e.g., the occasional
necessity for immediate interrogation or for short term incommunicado deten-
tion to prevent escape of confederates-the courts have no option but to modify
the over-rigid arraignment statutes, under the guise of formulating rules of
evidence. Yet the confusion which has followed in the train of the Mlc.\abb, An-
derson, and Mitchell cases dearly indicates the limited competence of appellate
courts at evolving consistent and useable arraignment rules,; 4 in the process of
reviewing the minor proportion of convictions which are taken on appeal.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The uncertain balance between the societal interest in protecting individual
civil liberties and the interest in apprehending criminals struck in the recent
Supreme Court decisions has evoked widespread controversy and produced a
number of alternate solutions.45 For the most part, the debate has centered about
the evidentiary issues, and there has been insufficient attempt to evaluate the de-
sirability of modification of the arraignment statutes or to consider procedures
other than exclusion which can.protect suspects.
42. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Reed interpreted the 3lAabb decision as cate-
gorically excluding all confessions made after delayed arraignments. fcNabb v. United
States, 318 U. S. 332, 349 (1943).
43. In Sykes v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 140 (App. D. C. 1944), citing the Mitchell
case, the "inducement by detention" test was applied as superseding that of the M,'Va144
case. No point was made of the similarity of the new criterion to the old norm of "Voluul-
tariness.'
44. Compare CoausAGari, MAjoRITY Ru,.a AND MImoRITY RIGHTS (1943) 65-83.
45. See eg., A STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE BILL Or RIGHTS OF Tim, Amsaax-
cw B A AssociATioN ox 1-R. R. 3690 (1944) ; %falloy, .fcNabb v. U. S.-Thc Fcdcral Rule
of Admissibiliity of Confessions (1943) 27 1AEQ. L. REv. 212; M!aschinot, McNabb v. U. S.
(1943) 21 CHI-K NT RrV. 340; Admissibility of Illegally Obtaincd Con fessions: The
Hobbs Bill (H. R. 3609) (1943) 3 LAw. Guno Rm. No. 6, 48; Waite, Comments (1944)
42 MicH. L. REv. 679, 909. See also (1944) 18 TEEN. L. REv. 212; (1944) 42 Mia. L Rsv.
717; (1943) 28 MmI. L. REv. 73.
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The Hobbs Bill. The police viewpoint was embodied in the Hobbs Bill,
40
introduced at the present Congressional session, which sought to restore the law
to its pre-McNabb status. The Bill proposed that "no failure to observe the
requirement of law as to the time within which a person under arrest must be
brought before a magistrate, commissioner, or court, shall render inadmissible
any evidence that is otherwise admissible." Leaders of the Bar, including the
Attorney General, objected to the proposed statute because of the probability
that its enactment, by removing the most effective present sanction against
official misconduct, would reopen the door to prolonged incommunicado deten-
tions.4 7 The bill also seems objectionable as an unwarranted interference with
the judicial power of formulating evidentiary rules for criminal proceedings.
Ride 5 of the Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure has proposed two com-
promise solutions of the dilemma.48 In both drafts, Rule 5 qualifies the present
arraignment statutes by requiring that suspects be taken before a commiting
officer "without unnecessary delay." 49 The original draft contained a further
provision categorically rendering inadmissible any statement made in response
to interrogation, during a period of illegal detention.50 This formulation, how-
ever, gave reasonable leeway to police and prosecuting attorneys by permitting
interrogation to continue until the point where the delay in commitment became
unreasonable. Presumably confessions obtained in the weekend-arrest or late
evening-arrest cases were thereby made admissible, but the ultimate power to
d termine when detention became illegal was vested in the judiciary. In addi-
tion, the wording of the first draft of Rule 5 permitted admission of voluntary
confessions or declarations not made in response to interrogation, regardless of
whether detention was illegally protracted.r1
46. H. R. 3690, 78th Congress, 1st Session, introduced by Representative Hobbs of
Alabama on November 18, 1943. The bill was reintroduced by Congressman Hobbs at the
2nd Session of the 78th Congress and reassigned the number, H. R. 3690. The House
Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill favorably on May 24, 1944, after amending
it to read as follows:
"To safeguard the admission of evidence in certain cases be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled
that the failure to observe the requirement of law to the time within which a person under
arrest must be brought before a magistrate, commissioner, or court shall not render inad-
missible any evidence that is otherwise admissible."
The bill has not been introduced in the Senate.
47. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 9, 61, 64, 83.
48. PRE ImINARY DRAFT OF FED. RULEs CRIM. PRoC. (1943) ; SECOND DRAFT or F .
RuLas Cvai. Pnoc. (1944).
49. PRE IxARY DRAFT OF FED. RULES CRir. Paoc. (1943) Rule 5 (a) ; SECOND DRAFT
or FED. RuLEs Cai. Paoc. (1944) Rule 5. Compare wording of statutes cited supra notes
5,6,7,8.
50. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF FED. RuLEs CaIM. PaoC. (1943) Rule 5 (b).
51. PRELIIiNARY DRAFT OF FED. RULEs CInT. PRoc. (1943) Note at 13-14.
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The provisions regulating the admissibility of confessions made during illegal
detentions were, however, deleted in the second draft of the Proposed Rules.
This made Rule 5 little more than a new arraignment statute, utilizing a some-
what liberalized "without unnecessary delay" time criterion. But the deletion
of subsection 1 (b) of the original draft relegated the Courts to the haphazard
process, begun in the McNabb case, of defining a satisfactory admissibility test.
Apparently motivated by the belief that some degree of early examination
was essential, Professor Waite, a member of the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Criminal Procedure, proposed that committing officers be empowered to in-
terrogate suspects at the preliminary hearing, after warning that any statements
might be used in evidence.52 This recommendation was rejected by the Com-
mittee majority on the grounds that it probably violated the privilege against
self-incrimination and that the non-legal training of many Commissioners made
it undesirable to endow them with investigative powers.53
The English Practice. Criminologists and jurists concerned about the need
for reform of the arraignment procedure have suggested that attention be given
to the more flexible English procedures." The British peace-time stat-
utes contain no express requirement for immediate presentment where there is
an arrest putsuant to warrant,55 but persons taken into custody without warrants
must be arraigned within 24 hours after arrest. 0 Where this is impossible, the
local Superintendent or Inspector of Police is required either to release the sus-
pect on a recognizance 57 or, where the crime appears to be serious in nature,
bring him before a court of summary jurisdiction "as soon as practicable." s
52. PRsLn=ARY DRAFT or Fin. RULEs CRr. PRoc. (1943) 253. Anakgous rules had
been suggested by other students. PoutMT, CRIUNAL JUSTICE x AmEMc.% (1930) 8;
judge Simeon Baldwin in 6 A. B. A. REP. (1883) 225, 238; NAT L Co .a. o.- LAw OnsmvA-
AxCE & E-FoRcmmET, RF,. No. 11 (1931) 5; 3 VIGmoRE, EvsMnXCE (3d ed. 1940) 319-20.
53. PR=LNARY DRAr or FEP. RuL.s Cant. Pnoc. (1943) 253-54.
54. Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested the impurtance of studying the English prac-
tice in the McNabb case. McNabb . United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943). See alh ,
Waite, Comment (1944) 42 MIcH. L. Rxv. 679; testimony of Pressman, Hearings, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 97; testimony of Hobbs, id. at 25.
55. The arrest statutes, however, contain language analogous to that of 18 U. S. C.
595, invoked by the court in support of the exclusionary rule in the McNabb case. See 4
HALsBuRYS STATuTEs (1929) 481, 482-83, 48637.
In Scotland, on the other hand, strict rules protect persons arrested with or without war-
rants. Interrogation of arrested persons by the police is forbidden, and confessions and
admissions obtained in this way are inadmissible in evidence. Ksxnv, ClumlAL PnocManc
rn Scom'AxD (1913) 16, 17, 18; REiNoN & BRowN, CnrIMIAL PRocEauRn Acc Or.no TEn
LAw op ScoLAxD (1928) 28,29,33-35.
56. The prisoner must be taken before a court of summary jurisdiction "as soon as prac-
ticable after he is. . .taken into custody." Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vicr.,
c. 49 § 38. This perio.d may not be extended beyond twenty-four hours. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, 4 & 5 GEv., c. 58, § 22. See also Metro-
politan Police Act, 1839,2 & 3 Vxcr., c. 47. ss. 70, 71; Municipal Corporations Act, 1832, 45
& 46 Vicr., c. 50, § 277; Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vircr., c. 50, § 9.
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In addition, special wartime statutes permit detention for as long as nine days,
providing authorization is obtained from local police executives and reported
to the Home Minister.5
9
The English cases dealing with extra-judicial confessions, although character-
ized by ambiguity, attempt to distinguish between pre- and post-arrest interro-
gation. Police officials are permitted to question suspects to determine whether
there are reasonable grounds for their arrest, and admissions made during such
preliminary inquiries may be introduced into evidence.°0 On the other hand, in
Regina v. Gavin,61 the Court of Queens Bench interpreted as involuntary a con-
fession given in response to interrogation immediately subsequent to arrest,
But while the police were thus restricted in questioning arrested persons, they
have been permitted to cross-examine for the purpose of removing ambiguities
in voluntary statements. Such statements and all gratuitous declarations by
prisoners are admissible in evidence.0 3 To avoid the rule against post-arraign-
ment questioning, police in London and a number of other cities developed the
practice of "detaining" suspects without arrest, on their own initiative04 Al-
though this star-chamber procedure ivas strongly criticized 05 by a Royal
Commission, confessions made during the period of detention have been held
admissible. 60
The dissimilarity of criminal organization in England and the United States 0?
and the divergence in basic conceptions as to the proper functions of prosecuting
officials 68 vitiates the British experience as a guide to American legislators. That
59. Sec. 18(o) Defens6 Regulations (1939), 34 HALSURY's STATUTES (1941) 642.
60. However, a standard of "voluntariness" is employed. Rex. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K. B.
531; Rex. v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 234 (1783); Reg. v. Thompson
[1893] 2 Q. B. 12.
61. 15 Cox C. C. 656 (1885). See also Reg. v. Male, 17 Cox C. C. 689, 690 (1893).
62. "When a prisoner is in custody the police have no right to ask him questions. Read-
ing a statement over, and then saying to him, 'what have you to say?' is cross-examining the
prisoner, and therefore shut it out. A prisoner's mouth is closed after he is once given in
charge, and he ought not to be asked anything." Reg. v. Gavin, 15 Cox C. C. 656, 657 (1885).
63. Reg. v. Male, 17 Cox C. C. 689 (1893). For an excellent summary of the English
law regarding the admissibility of confessions, see TAYLOR, EVIDENCE (12th ed., 1931)
§§ 862-901.
At the request of the Home Secretary, the Judges of the Kings Bench issued in 1912
a series of advisory rules for the guidance of police officers. These Judges' Rules were
amended in 1918. In 1930, an explanatory circular was issued by the Home Office, with the
approval of the Judges. See 6 POLICE JOUR. (1933) 342, 350 et seq.
64. See Rex. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K. B. 531.
65. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDUIE (1929)
Cmd. 3297 at 55-61.
66. Ibrahim v. Rex, [1914] A. C. 599, 609 P. C.; Rex. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K. B. 631.
67. The "gang" criminality of the United States is a unique characteristic of the Ameri-
can problem.
68. Under the English practice, the Crown prosecutors handle only a minor percentage
of the total number of criminal cases. The position of prosecutor is not a stepping stone to
political preeminence, and accordingly lesser emphasis is placed on the percentage of con-
victions. See HowAu, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENa.AND (1931) 4-15, 387.
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experience, however, underscores the unworkability of over-rigid rules and the
incapacity of the judiciary to resolve the conflicting interests involved without
legislative assistance.
CONCLUSION
The gulf between judicial conceptions of fairness and common police practice
suggests the desirability of drafting legislation which will grant the police rea-
sonable leeway in arraignment and early interrogation of suspects without un-
duly invading individual rights.60 The Attorney General has suggested replace-
ment of the present group of arraignment statutes by a single law providing that
presentment must take place "within a reasonable time." -o It was suggested
that in unusual cases, this might permit prolongation of detention for as much
as eight or nine days, without resort to a magistrate. Of course, to effectuate such
secluded interrogation, it would be necessary to abrogate the Constitutionally
guaranteed rights of habeas corpus, consultation with counsel, and release on
bail. It is highly doubtful that such legislation would or shoiuld be adopted, or
could survive judicial review. 7'
Indeed, except in dealing with unusual situations, -2 it is difficult to see why
police officers should be permtited to keep suspects in custody without arraign-
ment for more than 24 hours.73 For if incommunicado detention is protracted
beyond this point, Mr. justice Frankfurter's assumption in Ishcraft v. Tcnnes-
see,74 that a confession loses its voluntary character becomes psychologically
justifiable. The history of committal legislation indicates that the language in the
draft of Criminal Procedure Rule 5 directing arraignment "without unnecessary
delay," would probably be interpreted to permit procrastination only becau.e
of the unavailability of Commissioners. 7 Hence, if a 24-hour preliminary inves-
tigation period is to be allowed, specified authority should be provided in Rule
5 or the arraignment statutes.
69. Menwrandum, op. cit. supra note 22, at 1. 51; compare, JAcnso:., TILE 1A.cIUrar
oF JUSTICE n¢ ENGi.AND (1940) 141: "It is doubtful whether the police could do their ivorl:
efficiently if they did not develop practices for w hich there is no legal authority... If the
police are to respect the law, it will be necessary to redefine and probably enlarge their
powers.' See also Solicitor, The Right to a Fair Trial in PruAd. Rzro:x ii; EGLMAz.D (ed.
by Radzinowicz and Turner, 1940) 81.
70. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35-38.
71. Compare id. at 38.
72. See infra pp. 770-771.
73. After arraignment the prisoner is taken from the custody of the police and either
released on bail or placed under the supervision of the marshal. Since the marshal lacks
motives for seeking convictions and since the prisoner is entitled to see counsel and friends,
protracted questioning and the use of third degree methods rarely occur after arraignment.
See REPORT OF THE NAT'L Comm. ON LAw OnsEnvANCE AND E-;roTcsimErT (1931) No. 11,
169, 210-11; but see Hearings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13.
74. 322 U. S. 65 (1944).
75. See supra note .
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Unquestionably there are a few exceptional situations when the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation should be permitted, subject to appropriate restrictions,
to prolong incommunicado custody. In the first place, the interests of national
defense occasionally require secrecy in the investigation of sabotage plots or
treasonable activities. The ordinary mechanism of the arraignment statutes im-
pedes effective investigation in numerous ways: committal is usually accom-
panied with publicity which may serve to warn members of a loosely-knit espion-
age gang, enabling them to escape, destroy damaging evidence, or even intimi-
date or kill witnesses for the government .7  Furthermore, the officers may have
difficulty in immediately establishing probable cause against an arrested person,
who is believed to be part of, or know a great deal about a conspiracy. When
confronted with this problem in the investigation of the Quirin case,77 the Attor-
ney General found it necessary to direct disregard of the law "requiring me to
arraign all of them immediately, for the preservation of the country." 78
Special provision could readily be made for dealing with seditious activities
without extending the statutory time-limit of permissive detention for other
federal and District of Columbia offenses. The most feasible technique would
appear to be devisal of a statutory proceeding for "investigatory imprisonment,"
which would permit the F. B. I. to detain a suspect without presentment for a
period not exceeding eight days.79 The Bureau should be permitted to exercise
this extraordinary power only upon obtainment of a special warrant of arre. ,
Although executive officers were given unfettered power to utilize procedures
analogous to the proposed "investigatory imprisonment" during the Civil War SO
and similar procedures have been devised in Great Britain during both World
Wars,81 it would be safer to require that the special warrants could be issued only
by federal judges.8
2
76. See PEIuxNs, ELEMENTs oF PoucE SCIENCE (1942) 300.
77. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942). Eight Nazi saboteurs were arrested over a
period of eight or nine days; none were arraigned until all were captured. If arraignment
had been held promptly, some of .the saboteurs might have escaped. See Hearblys, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 35-36.
78. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36.
79. See ilemorandum, op. cit. supra note 22, at 37.
80. By proclamation, President Lincoln suspended habeas corputs "in respect to all per-
sons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any
. . . place of confinement by any military authority . . ." 13 STAT. 730 (1861). Congress
later authorized Lincoln to suspend habeas corpus "whenever, in his judgment, the public
safety may require it. 12 STAT. 755 (1863). The exercise of these powers by executive
officers is discussed in RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) c.
VII; 2 MomusoN, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE UNIzE STATES (1927) 255; CoRwiN, Trnn
PRESIDENT (1940) 185-89.
81. Parliament authorized the cabinet to promulgate regulations suspending even Magna
Charta's requirement that "no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or out-
lawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed . . . except by the legal judgment of his pcers
or by the law of the land." Emergency Defense Act of 1939, § 1, 34 HALSBURY'S STATUTLS
(1941) ; Defense Regulations of 1939, § 88c, 34 HALSBURY'S STATUTES (1941).
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A second special problem exists whenever the police are seeking to apprehend
accomplices of an arrested suspect. It has been suggested that public arraign-
ment will warn other members of the gang.83 However, the advantages of speedy
presentment could be retained, without hampering the police, if legislation were
enacted authorizing Commissioners to hold the preliminary hearing in the jail
or permitting remission of the suspect, after arraignment, for a limited period
of incommunicado detention.84 Presence of a gang-retained lawyer might per-
mit information of the arrest to reach the remainder of the gang. Accordingly
it might be desirable to withdraw temporarily the prisoner's right to select his
own counsel and direct the Commissioner to designate an attorney to represent
his interests.8 5 To present abuse it would again appear desirable to require
issuance by the Court of a special order for prison arraignment or limited post-
arraignment detention.80
Concomitant to revision of the arraignment statutes is the problem of devising
more effective sanctions to assure compliance with the requirement of lawful pre-
sentment.8 7 The fact that the McNabb rule is the only effective sanction now
operating does not, of course, make its retention desirable.
Several shortcomings of the exclusionary device are apparent. In the first
place, exclusion does not directly punish the official who unlawfully obtained a
confession, whereas it may force the public to incur a double expense by paying
for a new investigation and trial.8s Secondly, the .3cNabb rule may interfere
with the effective conduct of the trial by focusing the attention of the judge and
82. The latitudinarian nature of the powers possessed by the British Ministry of Home
Security was severely criticized by Lord Atkin in his dissenting opinion in Liversidge v.
Anderson, [1942] A. C. 206, 244. See also Pound, Adnsinistratho' Discretion and C il Lib-
erties i England (1943) 56 HAnv. L. r~v. 806; ef. Monison, up. cit. supra note SO, at 255.
83. Testimony of Attorney General Biddle in Hcarings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36.
84. See Memorandum, op. cit. supra note 22, at 39-40.
85. But query whether such an arrangement would survive judicial scrutiny, under the
rule of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
86. One presently unsettled question is whether a prisoner can waive arraignment or
the illegality of his detention so as to render his confession admissible. In United States v.
Haupt, 136 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) written waivers of custody were voluntarily
given. The court, however, rejected confessions obtained during the period of illegal deten-
tion on the grounds that the duties imposed by law on officers making arrests could not be
waived. Defendants had had no opportunity to consult counsel.
In United States v. Grote, 140 F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) a similar waiver was
signed. The court admitted the defendant's confession on the tenuous rationale that the
accused was not under arrest at the time of maling the statements. However, in the Mitchcll
case, the Supreme Court intimated that an oral waiver did not make an otherwise illegal
detention legal. 322 U. S. 65, 70 (1944). It is hard to see why the fact that the waiver was
written should make any difference.
87. The other presently available sanctions are (1) the private tort action for wrongful
imprisonment or abuse of legal process and (2) the threat of dismissal or discipline of a
misfeasant officer by his superiors. The practical uselessness of these sanctions are discussed
in Memorandum, op. cit. supra note 22, at 17-18.
88. See testimony of Circuit judge Stephens, Hearings, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13.
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possibly the jury on the conduct of the police rather than on the issue of the
accused's innocence or guilt. Even assuming the period of permissible deten-
tion were lengthened, a third disadvantage is that application of the McNabb
rule may lead to exclusion of confessions, although the trial judge is convinced
they constitute trustworthy testimony. 9 Moreover, unless the Courts, by
analogy to the "wire-tapping" cases,90 extended the McNabb rule so as to keep
out information obtained derivatively from statements made during an illegal
detention, the exclusionary device is probably not a sufficiently strong sanction
to prevent illegal detentions.
A more effective and judicious sanction than exclusion would be amendment
of the Judicial Code 91 to include unlawful detention by federal officers among
the contempts which can be summarily punished. If this were done, it would
be desirable to amend the rigid McNabb rule and vest in the federal judiciary
discretion to exclude confessions obtained during illegal detentions, when the
length of the delay or the character of imprisonment and examination created
doubts as to the voluntariness of a confession.
92
,89. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reed, McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332,
347 (1943) ; United States v. Lee 1-lee, 60 F. (2d) 924 C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; 3 Waottg,
EvIvmWE (3d ed. 1940) § 841; Comment (1943) 56 HARV. L. REV. 1003.
90. The doctrine that statements overheard by "wire-tapping" are inadmissible in the
federal courts, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 605 (1940); Nardone v. United States,
302 U. S. 379 (1937), has been extended to bar evidence obtained by use of hints obtained
by wire-tapping. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939). However, the testimony
of a witness, not a party to the communication, induced to testify by use of the intercepted
material, is admissible. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114 (1942).
In many states, the rule is that all evidence obtained by wire-tapping is admissible.
Young v. Young, 56 R. I. 401, 185 Atl. 901 (1936) ; Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A, (2d)
706 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 680 (1941).
91. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 385 (1940) limits the power of federal courts to
punish contempts to instances of "misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of
said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such of'
ficer, or by any... other person to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command
of the said courts."
92. See State v. Browning, 178 S. W. (2d) 77 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1944).
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